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Abstract This paper investigates policy actors’ positions on reducing emissions from defor-
estation and forest degradation (REDD+) expressed in Indonesian media, and shows how these
policy debates have evolved between 2007 and 2012. Results indicate media debates have
moved beyond early, buoyant consensus on REDD+ as a win-win solution for economic
growth and environmental conservation, to clearly acknowledge the need for institutional and
governance reform. Several shifts in the frequency and nature of REDD+ discourse around
2010 – including from an international to a national level focus and an increase in the level of
optimism – suggests the 2010 Letter of Intent between Indonesia and Norway has the potential
to be a significant driver of change. Results also indicate that translating political will into
measurable performance at a local or jurisdictional level is likely to require a broader
appreciation of the complex interests, expectations and implications associated with the
necessary reforms, and stronger engagement with key actor groups whose vested interests
go beyond REDD+ itself. We observe an apparent desire on the part of Indonesian national
authorities to have their cake and eat it too; that is, to keep their forest and clear it too.
1 Introduction
Carbon emissions from land use change—primarily tropical deforestation and forest degrada-
tion—account for as much as 15–20 % of all global carbon emissions (Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 2007). Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest
degradation (REDD+) has thus become a key area of debate in climate change policy
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processes. Mitigating climate change by compensating forest-rich developing countries in
return for preserving their forests has been presented as a more cost-effective solution to
mitigating climate change than many other greenhouse gas abatement options (Stern 2006).
REDD+ was officially recognised in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) Copenhagen Accord in December 2009, and was further endorsed in a more
formal package of decisions at the Cancun climate summit in December 2010.1 Yet many
questions remain about policy design and implementation, especially at the national and sub-
national level.
Indonesia is the world’s third largest emitter of carbon, and more than 75 % of the country’s
emissions come from deforestation. In this way, Indonesia’s REDD+ policies are not just
nationally but globally significant. Indonesia has been a major supporter of REDD+, having
enacted numerous regulations and established various institutions to ease the way for REDD+
implementation.
While policy-makers often rely on scientific expertise to inform policy processes—which
they portray as rational, objective, and evidence-based—in reality public policy and environ-
mental governance are fundamentally political processes, influenced by a multitude of inter-
ests, strategies and beliefs, as well as discursive practices that are used to frame policy
discourses (Hajer 1995; Jasanoff 2009). A variety of policy actors influence REDD+ policy
discourse and one way they do this is through the media (Di Gregorio et al. 2015).
Investigating how REDD+ has been portrayed in the media in the last decade in Indonesia,
can therefore help us to understand how the REDD+ policy agenda and public perceptions of
REDD+ have evolved over time.
This paper investigates how the media represent policy debates around REDD+ to the
Indonesian public, specifically in relation to the following key questions: 1) To what extent has
REDD+ emerged as a domestic policy issue and not just a global one? 2) Whose voices on
REDD+ are represented in Indonesian media and how prominent are they? 3) To what extent
do these voices advocate for substantive policy reform to address the drivers of deforestation in
Indonesia?
After a background section on REDD+ policy processes in Indonesia and the role of the
media in representing these processes, the paper describes the methods we applied to identify
and analyse media representations of REDD+ policy debates. The results highlight a shift from
international to national focus, the diversity of perspectives of different policy actors, and the
prevalence of an optimistic win-win storyline on REDD+ during its first decade of emergence
in Indonesia.
2 Indonesia’s REDD+ policy process and the role of the media
Policy processes, events and actors all contribute to shape how REDD+ is understood (Di
Gregorio et al. 2015. They also contribute to affect the salience of REDD+ in the media
1 The evolution of the REDD+ debate has seen a gradual expansion of scope: from RED, or ‘avoided
deforestation’ as it was referred to at COP 11 in Montreal, Canada; to REDD, incorporating avoided forest
degradation, which was endorsed at COP 13 in Bali, Indonesia; to REDD+, including forest conservation,
sustainable management of forests and reforestation/afforestation, which was first proposed in early 2009. Some
have even proposed REDD++, which includes carbon sequestration from agricultural activities. The model
endorsed in the Copenhagen Accord is accepted to be REDD+.
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(Entman 1993, p.53). which in turn affects public opinion, and thus policy processes, events
and actors.
2.1 National REDD+ policy processes in Indonesia
Since the 2007 UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP) held in Bali, Indonesia has engaged
in REDD+. Indonesia is unique in the global climate change arena because its greenhouse gas
emissions profile is heavily dominated by emissions from forest and peat lands, both areas in
which more efficient land use can increase economic returns as well as reduce greenhouse gas
emissions. Consequently, Indonesia has actively participated in multilateral initiatives driving
REDD+ at the global level (these include the World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Facility
and the United Nation’s Collaborative Programme on REDD+ [UN-REDD]). At the national
and subnational level, Indonesia has enacted numerous regulations and established various
institutions to ease the way for REDD+ implementation. The situation remains highly dynamic
– including since the 2014 change in government - but at the time of writing some of the key
REDD+ institutions and organizations include the Indonesian Forest Climate Alliance (IFCA),
the National Council on Climate Change (DNPI) and the REDD+ Agency (Fig. 1).
Indonesia was the first large developing country to announce, during the G20 meeting in
Pittsburgh in September 2009, a significant voluntary emission reduction target; in this case
26 %, or up to 41 % with international assistance. In May 2010 Indonesia signed a Letter of
Intent (LoI) with the Norwegian Government, through which the Norwegians pledged US$1
billion to help Indonesia address deforestation, forest degradation, and peat land conversion.
The bilateral partnership involves a range of initiatives, including micro-financing, institutional
capacity building and other policies and measures. It has been a significant driver of landmark
policy reforms including the Presidential moratorium on new forest concession licenses, issued
in May 2011 - renewed twice since - and a Constitutional Court ruling in May 2013, which
recognizes customary forests as separate to state forests.
REDD+ has arrived just a decade into Indonesia’s extensive decentralization process, and
the underlying struggle for control of and access to forest resources remains largely unresolved
Fig. 1 BREDD+^-related policy events in Indonesia
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(Moeliono 2009). Rates of deforestation and degradation in Indonesia remain high (Margono
et al. 2014). Nevertheless, some observers consider the 2010 LoI with Norway to represent a
major turning point in Indonesia’s approach to forest governance that could help deliver the
enabling policy environment for REDD+ to work (Murdiyarso et al. 2011). In a 2012 interview
(Lang 2012). CIFOR’s Director General Frances Seymour described the LoI as prompting:
BA tectonic shift in the dialogue about forests, who participates in it, realignment of
domestic constituencies among themselves and vis-à-vis international constituencies in a
way that I haven’t seen in 25 years.^
2.2 REDD+ and the media
Such major shifts can be identified in many different ways, including through media coverage.
The media, however, does not just portray policy events and discourses, it also contributes to
shape them. According to Boykoff (2008, p. 550). mass media are an Binfluential and
heterogeneous set of non-nation state actors^ that function as both windows onto, as well as
participants in, informal and formal discourses. On the one hand, media reports reflect existing
social perceptions of an issue and the power structures involved. On the other, media reports
affect social perceptions of an issue and the power structures involved. They do this through
framing, which means:
BTo select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a
communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal
interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item
described.^ (Entman 1993, p. 52).
In other words, media frames define problems, diagnose causes and promote specific
solutions. The power of a frame is its ability to bring certain aspects of reality into sharper
focus, while relegating other aspects to the background.
Not surprisingly, policy actors interact with the media in various ways to try to influence
news and media coverage, and therefore how the public perceive a particular problem or
potential solution (Kiousis et al. 2006; Boykoff and Smith 2010). Evidence also shows that
more powerful actors dominate media coverage and, consequently, the media often tend to
support the status quo (Boykoff 2008; Carvalho 2007). Media coverage is, therefore, the result
of mutual influence among policy events, policymakers, and the media themselves. By
examining the way policy processes are framed in the media - for example REDD+ in
Indonesia - and how various actors represent their interests to strengthen political coalitions
and affect public opinion, we can identify some of the main challenges in the policy arena on a
given issue.
As long as the media has been reporting on climate change there have been studies
about how this coverage has reflected and affected climate change policy. One
common thread, at least in the West, is that coverage of climate change tends to
uphold the political and economic status quo. For example, tabloid newspapers in the
UK adopt tones of fear, misery, and doom in order to foster Binertial acceptance of
status quo inequities rather than motivation to address associated issues of climate
change, socio-economic disparity, and differential vulnerability^ (Boykoff 2008, p.
563). Media representations of climate change are often strongly entangled with
ideological standpoints, with some outlets maintaining an ideological preference for
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Ba non-regulatory government and reinforcement of the social and economic status
quo^ (Carvalho 2007, p. 231).
There have been fewer studies into media coverage of climate change in develop-
ing countries (Shanahan 2009; Painter 2010). and those studies that have been carried
out have tended to focus on English-language newspapers, even though these tend to
have much narrower reach than their vernacular equivalents (Painter 2010). Painter’s
study on media coverage of COP15 contends that media coverage of climate change
in many of the world’s poorer countries is Bwoefully inadequate and insufficient to
match either the scale of the problem or the degree of vulnerability^ (Painter 2010, p.
20). He also cites Btoo cosy a relationship between the media and national political
leaders, which can lead to an unquestioning attitude of the powers-that-be or an over-
willingness to blame the West for global warming^ (p. 20).
This paper is part of a series of studies by CIFOR investigating REDD+ media discourse in
Indonesia, Brazil, Cameroon, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, Peru and Tanzania (Cronin and
Santoso 2010; May et al. 2011; Kengoum 2011; Pham 2011, Khatri et al. 2012; Babon et al.
2012; Alvarez et al. 2012; Kweka 2013, Di Gregorio et al. 2014). Overall, results of these
studies tend to support the findings on climate change coverage in the West, with national level
policy discourse rarely challenging the direct nor indirect drivers of deforestation and degra-
dation. This paper is an extension and elaboration of the Indonesia case.
It is worth noting the limitations of media analysis in providing an accurate and
comprehensive reflection of policy debates and public perceptions, especially in
developing countries. Although focusing on local language coverage is likely to
improve the breadth and accuracy, illiteracy and geographical diffusion is still likely
to impede the reach of this coverage (especially in a vast archipelago like Indonesia),
while the level of press freedom will affect the diversity and nature of voices being
heard. Freedom House, a U.S.-based think tank, classifies Indonesia’s media as only
Bpartly free^ in its annual Freedom of the Press Report.
Given the historical development of REDD+ in Indonesia, coupled with evidence from
previous media discourse analyses, we might expect REDD+ media coverage in Indonesia to
reflect: 1) the evolution of REDD+ policy in Indonesia, including towards a stronger focus on
implementation after 2010; 2) the emergence of an increasing diversity of stakeholders related
to Indonesia’s forest sector; 3) a reluctance to directly challenge the major drivers of
deforestation.
3 Methods
The media analysis undertaken here focuses on articles that discuss REDD+ and which have
appeared between December 2005 (when REDD+ first appeared on the international agenda)
and December 2012, in select Indonesian media. Three national newspapers were selected—
Kompas, Media Indonesia, and Republika—to represent a broad geographical, social, and
political spectrum. Daily circulation of Kompas is approximately 500,000, making it the most
widely read newspaper in Indonesia. It spans the religious and ethnic spectrum. Daily
circulation of Media Indonesia is approximately 300,000—the third highest in Indonesia—
and its target audience is middle to upper class. Daily circulation of Republika is approxi-
mately 100,000, concentrated largely in Java and Sumatra. Republika’s target audience is the
Muslim community and the majority of its readers are women.
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The population of news articles for the media analysis was compiled through an electronic
Boolean query using the keywords BREDD^, Breducing/reduced emissions from deforestation
and forest degradation^, and Bavoided deforestation^.2 All three newspapers are published in
Indonesian language.
Between 2007 and 2012 a total of 649 articles mentioning REDD+ appeared across all three
newspapers. Within the population of 649 articles that mention BREDD+^, 45 were considered
just passing references, which left 604 articles for in-depth coding and analysis. Coding
involved data collection at four levels. The first three levels used a standardized codebook.
Level 1 coding captures descriptive variables only, including the date, author, and length of the
article. Level 2 coding compiles specific characteristics of the media articles, including the
main topics and scale at which it is positioned. Level 3 coding identifies policy actors that are
cited in the media articles and their opinion statements – or stances (Kockleman 2004) - on
REDD+. The study identified 829 individual stances across the 604 articles.
Level 4 used inductive open coding to pool individual stances of these policy actors. We did
so by grouping direct quotes - or other attribution of opinion to a specific named policy actor in
the media - under broader stance categories where they shared a common (or meta) world view
on REDD+. This aggregation produced a total of 10 ‘stance categories’, which are in fact
frames, enabling us to associate actor groups with specific REDD + −related discourses in
Indonesia.
Much of the analysis in this paper refers to these stances and associated frames. While
acknowledging the important role of media as participants in informal and formal policy
processes, in this paper we use media accounts primarily as a window into policy processes, to
reflect how policy actors represent their opinions in the media. While the focus is therefore on
non-media policy actors, we do identify media as policy actors in the case of editorial or
opinion pieces. These account for 4 % of all actors that put forward positions on REDD+ (see
Fig. 4).
4 Results and discussion
4.1 From global events to national policies
The first mention of REDD+, or avoided deforestation, in Indonesian media occurred in 2007,
two years after the concept first emerged on the global climate change agenda. This coincided
with Indonesia’s hosting of COP13 in Bali in December 2007. Between 2007 and 2012 a total
of 649 articles mentioning REDD+ appeared across all three newspapers. Figure 2 illustrates
fairly constant growth in coverage following a drop in 2008 (38 articles), with a visible spike
from 2010 (86) to 2011 (203). This period included a number of significant national level
policy processes, including a bilateral partnership agreement with Norway, a Presidential
Moratorium on Forest Clearance (PRI 2011) and establishment of a REDD+ Agency.
This data also reflects another trend. That is, in the early years of REDD+ Indonesian media
coverage was very much tied to international events; specifically the UNFCCC Conference of
the Parties, held annually in December. Between 2007 and 2009, 68 % of all media coverage
2 BREDD^, Bpengurangan emisi dari deforestasi dan degradasi hutan^ and Bpencegahan deforestasi^ in
Indonesian.
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appeared in the December quarter. This percentage drops to 37 % between 2010 and 2012,
reflecting a more varied media focus.(Fig. 3).
This trend is further illustrated when we see the political ‘level’ at which the media articles
are positioned (Fig. 4). Between 2007 and 2009, 53 % of all coverage is focused on
international issues, with the bulk of the remainder at the national level. Between 2010 and
2012, this percentage of international coverage more than halves, dropping to just 24 %.
Conversely, 58 % percentage of media coverage now shifts to the national level, with a further
14 % located at the sub-national level. Even local level issues, which had been largely absent
from national coverage until 2009, started to emerge. While this is likely to be quite a natural
evolution as an issue like REDD+ matures, it is possible that the shift was at least in part
triggered, or accelerated, by the bilateral agreement with Norway in 2010.
4.2 A variety of voices, some louder than others
Within the media reports, an actor is cited on 829 occasions making a specific ideological,
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Fig. 3 Reporting level of media coverage on BREDD+^ (% of total articles)
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actor group, most of them at the national level (35 %, or 289 stances, see Fig. 4). Indonesian
government bodies include representatives from the Indonesian Ministries of Forestry (112
stances) and Environment (29), the National Climate Change Council (46) and REDD+ Task
Force (24). Indonesian sub-national and local-level government representatives make up a
further 6 % of stances (50), as do state actors from other nations, bringing the total proportion
of state actors to just under half (47 %).
The Indonesian Ministries of Forestry and Environment, as well as the National Climate
Change Council, are clearly crucial for REDD+ design and implementation. However, there is
a conspicuous lack of input into REDD+ discourse from other Ministries, especially consid-
ering that, for REDD+ to be successful, Bany rules must be capable of synchronising all
policies relating to REDD+ application, which will be connected to spatial planning, finance
and regional autonomy^ (Regional Legislative Assembly member Sarwono Kusumaatmadja,
quoted in Kompas 2008). The Ministries of Agriculture (1), Public Works (1) and Economic
Affairs (4) are featured sparingly, as is the National Development Planning Agency (7).
Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) make up 24 % of actors. The coding distinguishes
between international and domestic NGOs, and between environmental NGOs (ENGOs) and
others. The most commonly cited NGO group over the six year period is domestic ENGOs
(108 stances), which make up 53 % of all NGOs or 13 % of all actors (see Fig. 4). These
include the Indonesian Forum on Environment (Walhi), Indonesian Center for Environmental
Law (ICEL) and Greenomics. Again this reflects a shift in perspective from the early years of
REDD+ reporting, with international ENGOs - such as WWF, Greenpeace, and Flora & Fauna
International (FFI) - the dominant NGO group between 2007 and 2009 (11 % of all stances
compared to 5 % for domestic ENGOs).
National and international research centers, think tanks, and academic institutions account
for a further 11 % of actors (93 stances), while intergovernmental organizations (including the
UNFCCC and World Bank) make up 5 % (44 stances). Private sector actors – including
national and multi-national corporations and business associations – are featured on just 31
occasions (4 %) in total, and were virtually absent until 2010. Journalists or media actors put
forward their own positions on REDD+, for example in opinion pieces or editorials, on 37
occasions (4 %).
The dominance of national state actors within media-based discourse on REDD+ is
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government representatives tend to get advantaged access to the news media and as a result
become primary definers of key issues (Carvalho 2007; Anderson 2009). Nevertheless there is
a broad representation of other stakeholders on REDD+ being heard in Indonesian media,
which reflects the broad range of interests in the future of Indonesia’s forests, particularly at a
time when control of and access to forest resources remains largely unresolved (Moeliono
2009).
At the same time, the scant representation of many of these groups, compared to the
prevalence of government representatives, raises questions about power, equality, and the
potential for state actors to inform and influence public opinion and policy process on REDD+.
The absence of the private sector in media coverage on REDD+ is surprising, particularly
given their prominent role in managing and exploiting Indonesian forest resources.
4.3 How broad is REDD+ optimism?
Overall, between 2007 and 2012, 61 % of stances on REDD+ offered an optimistic assessment
of its likely impact on Indonesia. Another 19 % were pessimistic, 9 % neutral, and 11 %
offered no judgment. Broken down over time this optimism, while still dominant, declines
somewhat from 2007 (64 %) to 2010 (51 %). This decline coincides with the 2009 COP15
meeting in Copenhagen - which failed to make any meaningful progress towards a global
agreement on climate change - while a subsequent return in confidence coincides with the
significant national level policy events we have seen throughout late 2010 and 2011, revolving
around implementation of the bilateral partnership agreement with Norway and including the
Presidential Moratorium on Forest Clearance.
Future assessments of REDD+, charted against particular actor type reflect a substantial
diversity in opinions. For example, national-level Indonesian state actors (80 %) were highly
optimistic about REDD+. On the other hand, indigenous groups (38 %), farmers (50 %), and
domestic NGOs (41 %) were much less optimistic. This striking difference between the
perspectives of state actors and certain factions of civil society highlights the difficulty of
building consensus in designing and implementing REDD+. Moreover, the fact that the
largely-pessimistic indigenous groups, farmers, and domestic NGOs make up just 8 % of
actors cited in the media articles on REDD+, compared to 35 % for national state actors,
indicates that their concerns may be heavily marginalized in media discourse on REDD+, and
potentially in REDD+ policy processes.
4.4 From win-wins to trade-offs
Ten categories of stances on REDD+ expressed by actors were identified through open coding
(Table 1), which characterize the scope of discourse on REDD+ within the three selected
newspapers. These stance categories, or frames, cover a broad range of issues and topics,
ranging from concerns over indigenous rights and access (RIGHTS) and constraints to
Indonesia’s economic growth (GROWTH), to opinions on financing mechanisms
(MARKET) and sources of funding (INTERNATIONAL FINANCE).
The significance granted to these debates within Indonesian media can be seen in the
frequency of the various stance categories (see Table 1), while the level of consensus around
particular views can, to some extent, be seen in the coding of ‘agree’ versus ‘disagree’. More
pertinent, however, in reflecting the range and divergence of interests in on REDD+, is the
variety of stance categories themselves (see Table 1), which reflect the extent to which policy
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discourse encompasses a range of political and socio-economic perspectives. Therefore, we
predominantly consider the stances that agree, or align with, a particular category, and explore
the ways in which these relate to other categories, rather than analyse the interaction between
‘agree’ and ‘disagree’.
The two most frequent stance categories, which together accounted for more than 40 % of
the total 829 stances, were BREDD+ will require major institutional and governance reform^
(GOVERNANCE; 160 occasions, or 19 %) and BREDD+ should be part of the global solution
to climate change^ (SOLUTION; 136 or 16 %).
The discourse around REDD+ as a solution to climate change echoes the broad optimism
illustrated in Section 4.3, but also represents win-win rhetoric consistent with what Saunders et
al. describe as a Blight touch version of sustainable development^ (2010), which leaves
existing inequalities unchallenged and fails to address the complex shifts and trade-offs in
policy, society and industry that will be required to make a scheme like REDD+ work.
On the other hand, stances related to the need for major institutional and governance reform
point very much to the need for change, and start to acknowledge the systemic flaws in
Indonesia’s forestry sector that have contributed to the country’s historically high levels of
deforestation. Consider, for example, the following statement from the Indonesian Center for
Environmental Law:
BThere are classic problems in the governance structure: corruption, poor institutional
and inter-sectoral coordination, and legal uncertainty. If these are not resolved, then any
mechanism applied will fail^ (12th December 2007; Kompas).
As we have seen in our analysis of other trends - including frequency, level and outlook -
there was something of a shift in REDD+ media discourse around 2010. Discourse around
governance reform became particularly pronounced following Indonesia’s Letter of Intent with
Norway in early 2010. To illustrate, between 2007 and 2009, the GOVERNANCE frame was
the fourth most frequent, accounting for 27 (12 %) of 220 stances put forward by policy actors
Table 1 Stance categories on REDD+ (17 stances categorized as ‘other’ are not included)
Stance Category Agree Disagree
GOVERNANCE: REDD+ will require major governance and institutional reform 160 8
SOLUTION: REDD+ (or at least forests) should be part of the global solution to climate
change
136 21
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: REDD+ should be financed by developed countries 75 8
SCOPE: REDD+ should incorporate avoided degradation, conservation and reforestation, not
just avoided deforestation
69 10
RIGHTS: REDD+ risks reducing access to forest resources and harming traditional forest
users
68 8
GROWTH: REDD+ should not compromise Indonesia’s economic growth, including that
generated through agricultural expansion
48 24
CENTRALISED: REDD+ programs should be formulated and managed at the national level 46 8
CAPACITY BUILDING: REDD+ will require major technical capacity building 45 4
CO-BENEFITS: REDD+ should provide co-benefits apart from combating climate change 41 2
MARKET: REDD+ should be financed by a carbon offsetting market mechanism 21 10
TOTAL 709 103
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in the media. Between 2010 and 2012, this proportion more than doubled, to 138 (28 %) of
495 stances.
Other stance categories that grew in prominence between 2007 and 09 and 2010–12 were
those calling for REDD+ to incorporate a broad scope of land uses (SCOPE; from 6 % to 12 %
of total stances for the period, and 7th to 3rd in frequency); and those calling for REDD+ not to
jeopardise Indonesia’s economic growth (GROWTH; 5 % to 8 % and 10th to 5th). Both
categories relate to complex debates around trade-offs and opportunity costs, illustrated in the
level of polarization among stances linked to GROWTH; with a third of all stances coded as
‘disagree’ (compared to an average of just 13 % across all stance categories).
Consider, for example, the following statement from the Indonesian Association of Forest
Concessionaires, in relation to a proposed moratorium on new forest concessions: BBusiness
sees the moratorium as a barrier for them … (and) as a form of foreign dictatorship to
Indonesia in forest management^ (4th October 2010; Republika). Not only does this frame
REDD+ as a barrier to economic growth, it touches on additional issues of sovereignty and
international relations, which we’ll explore in more detail in the next section as we consider
who is saying what.
4.5 Keep the forest and clear it too?
There is no escaping the fact that national-level state actors are the dominant voice in REDD+
reporting (Fig. 4), so it’s important to understand these actors’ most common positions if we
are to understand the nature of REDD+ public discourse in Indonesia.
We have seen that the future assessment of REDD+ from national state actors in Indonesia
is predominantly optimistic, but that there are notable gaps in which national Ministries are
cited. We have also seen that the third most frequent stance category across all actor groups is
BREDD+ should be financed by developed countries^ (INTERNATIONAL FINANCE,
Table 1), which was put forward on 75 occasions. On 34 of these 75 occasions, this stance
was put forward by a national-level, Indonesian state actor.
This stance positions tropical forests as providing global environmental services and is
generally based on the premise that developing countries like Indonesia will be forced to
curtail their economic growth by locking up their forests as carbon sinks. They must, therefore,
be compensated accordingly. Consider the following position articulated by Indonesia’s
Minister of Forestry, M.S. Kaban, in 2007:
For Kaban, as long as there is no commitment from developed countries to adopt
REDD, global efforts to resolve climate change will remain unfair. BIf there are no ties
[emission reduction targets] for developed countries, developing countries will have no
certainty, because the prop for developing countries is resources,^ he said (Media
Indonesia 2007).
At the same time, other stance categories frequently put forward by national state actors in
Indonesia are that BREDD+ should incorporate avoided degradation, conservation and refor-
estation, not just avoided deforestation^ (SCOPE, 31 occasions) and BREDD+ should not
compromise Indonesia’s economic growth, including that generated through agricultural
expansion^ (GROWTH, 24 occasions). Both positions are linked to ensuring REDD+ incor-
porates multiple land use options, including sustainable forest management and reforestation.
This could potentially mean rewards for reduced impact logging and industrial-scale plantation
forestry, which would enable Indonesia to capitalize on international funding for forest
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preservation, while also enjoying economic growth opportunities through forest conversion.
As Kaban stated before COP13: BREDD must not be counterproductive to utilising industrial
plantation forests as revenue sources^ (Trahutama and Suhartono 2007).
This apparent desire for Indonesia to keep its forest and clear it too does not necessarily
contravene the principles of REDD+, given many issues relating to scope and forest definition are
yet to be entirely resolved (Angelsen and McNeil 2012). It does, however, illustrate something of a
disconnection between political discourse on REDD+, and the practical realities of REDD+. This
disconnection is highlighted by the conspicuous absence of a corporate voicewithinmedia reporting,
despite the fact that private sector actors driving deforestation and forest degradation in Indonesia
will need to be engaged in REDD+ policy making if REDD+ is to work (Indrarto et al. 2012).
In any case, debates around land use and economic development within REDD+ are clearly
related to questions of land tenure security faced by smallholders and the rights of local and
indigenous communities (Larson 2010; Myers Madeira et al. 2010; Sunderlin et al. 2013).
However, on only 8 occasions did a national state actor address the concern that BREDD+ risks
reducing access to forest resources and harming traditional forest users^ (RIGHTS). Beyond
state actors, however, ‘rights’ was one of the most common frames, put forward (76 stances in
total), most frequently by Indigenous organizations (18 times) and ENGOs (15 times by
international organizations and 11 times by domestic).
What is clear is that for REDD+ to work in Indonesia will require major change. What is
not clear is what this change will look like. The need for change is reflected most clearly in the
high frequency of discourse around the Bneed for major governance and institutional reform^
(GOVERNANCE). While it is encouraging to see this need increasingly recognized by those
in positions of power, it also reinforces the difficulty that Indonesia will face in reconciling
these reforms with an apparent expectation of business as usual; particularly given that many
of those needed to drive and implement the reforms (e.g. ministries other than Forestry and
private sector actors) are scarcely engaged in public debates on REDD+.
5 Conclusion
This paper has investigated how policy actors’ opinions on REDD+ are represented in Indonesian
media, with a view to identifying potential challenges in the policy process. Overall, there was has
been a sustained increase in reporting on REDD+ from 2008 to 2011 (following an early spike in
media attention as Bali hosted the UNFCCC COP13 in December 2007), before a drop in 2012.
We have seen that, over time, focus has gradually shifted frommilestone international meetings to
domestic policy events and that state actors remain the dominant voice in REDD+ reporting.
The national REDD+ policy arena in Indonesia features many competing interests, both within
and beyond government. Although stakeholders are predominantly optimistic about REDD+, policy
discourse reveals the difficulty of addressing such diverse interests. Media debates have moved
beyond early, buoyant consensus on REDD+ as a win-win solution for economic growth and
environmental conservation, to clearly acknowledge the need for institutional and governance
reform.
The timing of these shifts in discourse suggest that the 2010 LoI between Indonesia and
Norway may have been something of a catalyst, including in moving political will from the
global to the national level. The 2011 Presidential moratorium on clearing primary forest and
peatland areas – in part driven by the Norwegian agreement –reflects this political commit-
ment. Nevertheless, translating political will into measurable performance at a local or
68 Climatic Change (2016) 137:57–70
jurisdictional level, is likely to require the engagement and support of key actor groups –
including the private sector - whose vested interests go beyond REDD+ itself.
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